Aims-To evaluate state cigarette excise tax pass-through rates for selected price-minimizing strategies.
INTRODUCTION
Tobacco consumption is a leading cause of preventable death in the world, with 100 million deaths attributed to it during the 20th century and nearly a billion deaths projected for the 21st century [1] . In the United States, despite declines in adult cigarette smoking prevalence during the past 50 years, tobacco use remains the nation's leading preventable cause of death and disease [2] .
Increases in unit price of cigarettes are inversely related to smoking [3] [4] [5] . Excise tax is one of the primary public health strategies used to increase price [1, 6, 7] . However, instead of quitting or reducing consumption, smokers may seek lower-priced cigarettes, thereby potentially undermining the public health benefit of tax increases [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] .
statistical significance within groups (P ≤ 0.05). We suppressed estimates with a denominator sample size less than 30, or a relative standard error more than 30% [36] .
We compared average per pack prices among pack purchasers, carton purchasers, premium brand purchasers and generic brand purchasers, those who purchased cigarettes on Indian reservations during the past 12 months and those who did not purchase on Indian reservations during the past 12 months. Within each of those groups, we stratified on coupon use, yielding 18 comparison groups. We compared unadjusted averages with averages adjusted for other price-minimizing strategies to account for the use of overlapping strategies, using the regression specification in the following:
where the dependent variable was individual per pack price and coefficients, β 2 , reflected price reductions associated with overlapping price-minimizing strategies (OtherPMS). Therefore, the constant, β 1 , presented the adjusted average per pack price before using any other price-minimizing strategies (e.g. the adjusted average price for carton purchasers was obtained by controlling for coupon use, purchase from Indian reservations and brand choice).
For each of the 18 groups described above, we also used separate multivariate regressions with the following specification to estimate pass-through rates of excise tax:
The key variable of interest was state monthly excise tax (Tax). The covariates of other price-minimizing strategies were used to control for potential impacts of overlapping strategies on the actual price paid. Therefore, the coefficient, β 2 , represents the pass-through rate of excise tax by price-minimizing strategy, independent of use of other strategies.
To illustrate potential impacts of state-level factors on the estimated pass-through rate by price-minimizing strategy, we used two identical regression models to assess the sensitivity of these estimates, except one with additional controls for state covariates (state) and one without. We also performed statistical tests to compare the differences in estimated passthrough rates for pack versus carton purchasers, those who purchased cigarettes on Indian reservations during the past 12 months versus those who did not and the users of premium versus generic brands. All analyses were conducted with SAS-callable SUDAAN (version 9.2). Post-stratification sampling weights were incorporated into all analyses to account for the complex survey design of the NATS and non-response. Table 1 shows demographic and cigarette use characteristics of current smokers by priceminimizing strategy. Among 16 542 smokers, 54.0% (10 393) used one or more strategy. Specifically, 61.3% purchased cigarettes by pack without coupon, 14.9% purchased by pack with coupon, 19.0% purchased by carton without coupon, 4.7% purchased by carton with coupon, 8.8% purchased cigarettes on Indian reservations and 23.6% purchased generic brands.
RESULTS

Characteristics by price-minimizing strategy
Pack purchase without coupon decreased with increasing age (Table 1) . Minority, male and employed smokers were more likely to purchase by pack without a coupon than white, female and unemployed smokers, respectively. Smokers who were not in a relationship at the time of the interview were more likely to purchase by pack without coupon than those who lived with partners or were married. Pack purchase with coupon decreased with increasing household income.
The proportion of smokers who made carton purchase increased with age. Carton purchase without coupon was more common among non-Hispanic white, female, unemployed smokers or those who had a bachelor degree or higher, while it was less common among those who were not in a relationship. Smokers who were not in a relationship were also less likely to purchase cigarettes by carton with coupon, whereas unemployed smokers were more likely to use this strategy.
Cigarette purchase made on Indian reservations was more common among smokers of race/ ethnicity other than non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black and His-panic and among the employed, although it was less common among those who were not in a relationship. The proportion of smokers who bought generic brands increased with age, but decreased as household income rose. Generic brands were used more commonly by non-Hispanic white, female or unemployed smokers, but were less popular among those who were not in a relationship.
Non-daily smokers, smokers who consumed fewer than 10 cigarettes per smoked day, smokers with quit attempts during the previous year or smokers who consumed after the first hour of their day were more likely to purchase cigarettes by pack.
In contrast, carton purchase was more common among daily smokers, smokers who consumed more than 10 cigarettes per day, smokers without quit attempts or smokers who smoked within the first hour of their day (Table 1) . A similar situation also existed among generic brand users. Indian reservation purchase, however, was more common among smokers who consumed more than 20 cigarettes per day. Table 2 presents unadjusted and adjusted average prices per pack by price-minimizing strategy. The unadjusted average per pack price paid by pack purchasers was $5.48, whereas that of carton purchasers was $4.06. After adjusting for brand choice and likelihood of purchasing on Indian reservations, the average per pack price for premium brands was $5.62 for pack purchasers and $4.38 for carton purchasers. Also, coupon use saved another 60 cents per pack for pack purchasers or 2 cents for carton purchasers. Consequently, compared with pack purchasers with no coupon used, carton purchasers would save $1.26 per pack or $12.6 per carton with coupons.
Average price per pack by price-minimizing strategy
Compared with the unadjusted average per pack price, $5.15, paid outside Indian reservations, those who purchased cigarettes on Indian reservations during the past 12 months paid $4.74. After adjustment of brand choice and quantity purchased, the average price for premium brands was $5.62 for purchases outside Indian reservations. The adjusted average price of Indian reservation purchases was $5.67. Overall, coupon use discounted another 10 cents per pack for smokers who purchased cigarettes on Indian reservations during the past 12 months, or a 57-cent per pack discount for purchases outside Indian reservations.
The unadjusted average price for premium brands was $5.42 per pack, whereas that of generic brands was $4.31. After controlling for quantity purchased and likelihood of purchasing from Indian reservations, the adjusted average price was $5.63 for premium brands which, as expected, is very similar to the average price paid by pack purchasers ($5.62) or paid outside Indian reservations ($5.62) after adjustment. The adjusted per pack price for generic brands was $4.74, representing a saving of 56 cents. Coupon use discounted additional 57 cents for premium brand smokers, although it did not provide significant discount for smokers of generic brands.
Cigarette excise tax pass-through rates by price-minimizing strategy
The estimated pass-through rates of state excise tax are reported in Table 3 . Controlling for demographic characteristics, season and price-minimizing strategies the pass-through rate was 1.18 for pack purchasers, meaning that a $1 increase in excise tax was associated with roughly a $1.18 increase in price paid for premium cigarettes outside Indian reservations. After including the state covariates, the pass-through rate was approximately 1.10. With the same controls, the pass-through rate was 0.66 for carton purchasers, indicating that a $1 increase in tax was associated with a 66-cent increase in price paid by carton purchasers for similar cigarettes. The differences in corresponding pass-through rates between pack and carton purchasers (e.g. 1.10 versus 0.66) are statistically significant.
The pass-through rate for smokers who purchased cigarettes from Indian reservations during the past 12 months was 0.50 after controlling for demographic, season, state variables and overlapping price-minimizing strategies. The pass-through rate was reduced further to 0.30 with coupon use, whereas the corresponding estimate for comparable purchases outside Indian reservations was 1.07. The differences in these corresponding pass-through rates (e.g. 1.06 versus 0.50) are also statistically significant.
The pass-through rate was 0.82 for smokers of generic brands when controlling for demographic, season, state variables and overlapping price-minimizing strategies, whereas that for premium brand users was 1.04. Again, statistical tests suggest that the pass-through rates for generic brands were significantly lower than those for premium brands (e.g. 1.04 versus 0.83).
DISCUSSION
This study used data from a national representative survey to evaluate smokers' use of priceminimizing strategies, average price per pack paid and pass-through rates of excise tax. We found that at least 54.0% of current smokers had used one or more strategies in the previous year, and their demographic and smoking characteristics varied by these strategies. Substantial variations also existed in average prices paid with these strategies. Smokers who purchased by carton, who purchased on Indian reservations or who purchased generic brands paid consistently less than those who did not practice these strategies. Coupon use also rendered additional price reductions.
Our study is unique in that we are able to show how the effect of cigarette tax depends upon smokers' price-minimizing strategies, and to demonstrate that not every smoker bore the same amount of tax. Excise tax was over-shifted to smokers of premium brands who purchased by pack outside Indian reservations: for every $1 tax increase, they paid the entire amount of the tax together with an additional premium of 7-10 cents. The estimated overshifting is consistent with existing evidence, although our data and methodology differ substantially [22, 26, 31] .
More importantly, carton purchasers (23.7%), generic brand users (23.6%) or those who bought cigarettes on Indian reservations (8.8%) did not realize the same increase in price for the tax increase. These smokers paid only 30-83 cents for the additional tax dollar, representing a saving of 17-70 cents. This might be one of the reasons that some previous studies found that the excise tax was under-shifted to some smokers, while most existing studies found the over-shift of excise taxes [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] .
Because carton purchasers and generic brand users were more likely to be daily, heavy or more addicted smokers, tax savings rendered among these subpopulations might be subsidized by the premiums paid by pack purchasers, who were more likely to be occasional, light or less addicted smokers. Consequently, price-minimizing strategies may disproportionally mitigate the tax effect among daily, heavy or more addicted smokers.
The federal government recognizes that Native American tribes are sovereign nations. Therefore, tribal members are exempted from state excise tax on cigarettes sold on Indian reservations. However, US Supreme Court decisions have suggested that state taxes can be collected on cigarettes sold to non-members on Indian reservations [37] [38] [39] . In practice, however, not all states have established inter-governmental agreements with tribes to collect cigarette tax on sales to non-tribe members on tribal lands, as such agreements can be politically and functionally complicated to negotiate [40] . Therefore, on many reservations, state taxes, which ranged from $0.17 to $4.35 per pack on 1 July 2010 [34] , are not applied to these sales. This may partly explain the under-shift of excise tax among those who were likely to purchase cigarettes on Indian reservations.
After adjustment for brands and quantity purchased, the average price paid by smokers who were likely to purchase cigarettes on Indian reservations increased considerably, from $4.74 to 5.67, which is comparable to the price paid for a similar purchase outside Indian reservations. This finding implies that smokers were more likely to buy cigarettes of generic brands, or purchase by carton on Indian reservations. Moreover, considering that the tax pass-through rate was statistically lower for those who were likely to have made their purchases on Indian reservations, and remarkably lower than the rate of carton purchase or that of generic brands, prices in nearby cigarette retailers outside Indian reservations could be much higher than the nation-wide average price [41] . Consequently, smokers who live in close proximity to Indian reservations were likely to spend their time and other resources to purchase 'state tax-free' cigarettes there. However, more refined analysis is warranted to further explore the determinants of Indian reservation purchase.
Young adults, African Americans and Hispanics were more likely to purchase by pack without coupons, but less likely to purchase generic brands. Therefore, tax increases were probably passed on to them in the form of higher cigarette prices. This is consistent with the evidence that these subpopulations are more responsive to tax increases [3, 42] .
We also found that the tax was shifted more heavily to carton purchasers who used coupon or other discounts than their counterparts who did not. More research is needed to understand the combination of carton purchase and coupon use.
This analysis has some limitations. First, not all smokers in the NATS were asked about purchases on Indian reservations during the past 12 months. Because of an approval delay during the first 2 months of data collection, the Indian reservation question was not added to the questionnaire until late November 2009. However, among 16 542 current smokers, 13 008 (78%) provided a response for this question, and data on this question were collected in all states and DC. Secondly, survey questions about cigarette purchases had different timeframes (e.g. carton purchase and coupon use were asked for the latest purchase, whereas brand choices were asked for the purchase during the past 30 days, and Indian reservation purchase was asked for the past 12 months). This time-frame issue is likely to have resulted in an underestimate of the proportion of smokers who used price-minimizing strategies during the previous year. However, the issue should not affect our findings on pass-through rates, besides interpretations of these findings, as these estimates do not necessary reflect the reductions during that time-period. In addition, smokers may endogenously use priceminimizing strategies in response to excise tax increases. To assess potential impacts of the endogeneity on our findings, we performed two sensitivity analyses. We replicated the analysis by excluding smokers from two states where taxes were raised during the NATS sampling period (Pennsylvania and Washington), and by stratifying samples with above and below the average state excise tax. These sensitivity results suggest that potential impacts of endogeneity on our findings are very limited, except for carton purchasers. The pass-through rate was statistically lower for carton purchasers living in states with taxes higher than the average compared to those living in states with taxes lower than the average. Tobacco regulation at local jurisdictions that changed during the sampling period are not captured in the analysis, although we include comprehensive controls for evidence-based state tobacco control policies. However, these local policy changes are less likely to affect the tax passthrough rate at the national level. Finally, like other telephone surveys, the response rate of the NATS is low (37.6% of the National Council of American Survey and Research Organizations response rate) [43] , and the information collected is subject to recall bias. However, the sample used for the analysis is weighted to account for the complex survey design and non-response.
Findings show that, during 2009-10, a substantial proportion of smokers used priceminimizing strategies. By reducing pass-through rates of state excise taxes, these strategies are likely to lower the benefit that increased taxes would have on reducing the demand for cigarettes. The proportion of smokers who use price-minimizing strategies may be likely to rise because of increasing excise taxes in the future. Policies that can reduce such costreduction opportunities, such as setting a high floor price for cigarettes, prohibiting discounts or promotions or expanding state-level negotiations with tribes to collect taxes from non-member purchases, would probably be effective in reducing cigarette use and promoting cessation. Table 1 Demographic characteristics of current smokers by price-minimizing strategy. Table 2 Adjusted and unadjusted average cigarette price by price-minimizing strategy.
References
World Health Organization (WHO
Unadjusted Adjusted
Price-minimizing strategies n Average price a n Average price a Pack purchasers only b b Adjusted for purchase from brand (generic = 1 and others = 1) and Indian reservation (Indian = 1).
c Adjusted for pack purchase (carton = 1) and brand (generic = 1 and others = 1).
d Adjusted for carton purchase (carton = 1) and purchase from Indian reservation (Indian = 1). Estimated tax pass-through rates by price-minimizing strategy. c adjusted for carton purchase, Indian reservation purchase and coupon use;
d adjusted for carton purchase and Indian reservation purchase.
e For each row, an independent model was run restricted to those with the price-minimizing strategies for that row.
We compared estimates between carton versus pack, Indian reservation versus no Indian reservation and premium brands versus generic brands, and found that the estimates were significantly different for all (P ≤ 0.05). Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
